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This paper contrasts UK and US governance of M&A break fees to see what the contrast 
can teach us about trade-offs between litigation and regulation as modes of governance, 
including how laws change under each regime over time.  Data on 1,136 bids in 1989-
2008 and 61 fee disputes show:  (1) the UK caps fees at a low level with a simple ex ante 
rule based not on regulatory expertise but on an arbitrarily chosen percentage of bid 
value, which nonetheless has the virtues of clarity and lower litigation costs, and 
enhances competition conditional on an initial bid, and (2) US courts evaluate fees ex 
post with a complex and vague standard, allowing for greater variation and higher 
average fees, reducing bid competition and increasing bid completion rates, and possibly 
increasing M&A overall, at the cost of legal uncertainty and litigation (although less than 
might be expected), in part because courts resist articulating clear rules.  Laws in each 
nation exhibit inertia; are protected by entrenched interest groups (institutional investors 
in the UK, lawyers in the US); and co-exist with the opposite approach (litigation in the 
UK, regulation in the US), even within the domain of M&A law.  Subject to strong limits 
on external validity, the case study suggests that interest groups may be the most 
important factors shaping the initial choice between regulation and litigation, even for 
otherwise similar nations in a similar context, and that a combination of interest groups 
formed in response to a given choice, as well as lawmaker incentives, may preserve those 
choices even after the conditions giving rise to the initial choice have passed away. 
 
 M&A Break Fees: 
US Litigation vs. UK Regulation
*
 
The United States and the United Kingdom have well-developed economies and capital 
markets.  They also share a legal tradition, including a liberal approach to economic 
activity.  In some key areas of capital market governance, however, their legal systems 
formally diverge.  One example – salient to merger and acquisition (M&A) academics –
  is the treatment of hostile bids (e.g., Armour & Skeel 2007).  This paper analyzes 
another difference, one more routinely of importance to M&A practitioners:  the 
treatment of “deal protection” – i.e., contracts that reduce the risk to a bidder of a 
competing bid, such as “break fees” paid by a target if acquired by a competing bidder.  
The UK caps such fees with a bright-line rule set by a regulatory body.  In the US, courts 
review break fees in ex post litigation applying a standard developed over time in the 
common law tradition.  This paper explores the effects of this formal contrast between 
regulation and litigation on the same behavior by two similar countries, using data on 
bids, fees, bid outcomes, and bid litigation to explore whether the formal difference 
matters in practice, and whether and how the two approaches to governance change and 
diverge over time.   
 
Any comparison of law in two countries faces a serious omitted variable problem, and 
one can only generalize so far about trade-offs between litigation and regulation from one 
law.  Still, a comparison of deal protection in the UK and the US should yield some 
information.  The two nations have similarly active M&A markets, with a large number 
of bids for public companies comprising 75% of worldwide bid volume (Rossi & Volpin 
2004).  They have similar corporate governance systems (e.g., Kraakman et al. 2009), 
with large companies and dispersed ownership (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999), which (as 
discussed below) generates the need for deal protection.  And they have shared political, 
legal, and cultural traditions (U.S. State Department 2009), including M&A practitioners 
that work in both nations.  The topic should also be of independent value to those who 
study or work in the M&A markets:  deal protection is used regularly in friendly M&A, 
which is far more prevalent and may be more economically important than hostile bids. 
 
Part I briefly reviews relevant literatures on (a) regulation and litigation, (b) the evolution 
of laws over time, and (c) deal protection, including the reasons deal protection contracts 
are used.  Part I also briefly describes the legal treatment of break fees in the UK and the 
US, and conjectures why the nations have diverged in this aspect of capital markets 
governance.  Part II summarizes data, including break fees, on large friendly control bids 
for non-financial targets drawn from Thomson, representing ~50% of total bid volume in 
the US and UK over the past 20 years.  Trends in the size of break fees in the US and the 
UK are depicted against the backdrop of changes in regulation of break fees.  Part III then 
relates break fee size to rates of deal competition and deal completion, two deal outcome 
variables that break fees are intended to affect.  Univariate and multivariate results are 
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1 presented, and the robustness of the findings is tested with alternative specifications.  Part 
IV concludes with observations on trade-offs between litigation and regulation and the 
evolution of law more generally. 
 
Part I.  Prior Literature 
 
I.A.  Regulation and Litigation 
 
A growing literature in economics and law recognizes and explores trade-offs in different 
modes of political governance of economic activity.
1  One mode, associated with 
classical liberalism, is for the state to assign clear property rights ex ante, permit private 
parties to write their own legal rules through contract, enforce those contracts through 
privately initiated lawsuits heard by independent courts, and otherwise refrain from 
interfering with production or trade.  Because this mode of governance relies on court 
enforcement of property and contract rights, it is often identified as “litigation.”  A 
second mode, associated with political reactions to industrialization in the late 19
th and 
20
th centuries, is for the state to establish expert regulatory agencies, subject to political 
control, which “regulate” economic activity through explicit ex ante controls, enforce 
those controls directly with criminal or civil penalties imposed by state-controlled 
enforcement agencies, subject to judicial oversight, and override, and forbid or control 
private contracts.  This mode is often identified as “regulation.”   
 
I.A.1  Ex ante Rules vs. Ex post Standards 
 
The contrasts between litigation and regulation are thus various, including general 
content, the method by which law is created and enforced, and features of the institutions 
charged with lawmaking and enforcement.  A common focus of contrast, however, is the 
timing of lawmaking and enforcement (e.g., Shavell 1984a,b; Schwartzstein & Shleifer 
2009).  Regulation specifies and enforces entitlements in detail ex ante, before activities 
occur, so (if perfect) violations are avoided.  Litigation relies on private parties to sue for 
money in court ex post, after activities and potential legal violations have occurred.  If 
parties are judgment proof, for example, ex ante specification and enforcement may be 
beneficial (Shavell 1984a,b, 1993, Summers 1983).  But courts can grant injunctions as 
well as award damages, and many economic harms are not so large as to cause 
insolvency.  If economic activities have positive externalities and both ex ante regulations 
and ex post court decisions are prone to error, then regulation can improve welfare by 
eliminating or reducing the risk of mistaken ex post liability and so inducing socially 
beneficial activities, such as drug research (e.g., Schwartzstein & Shleifer 2009).  But 
much regulation has been developed to address negative externalities, rather than positive 
                                                 
1 One can also contrast socialism, with state ownership of the means of production and/or trade, as with the 
U.S. Postal Service; and anarchy, with no clear specification of property rights, as with second-hand 
cigarette smoke, or no effective state enforcement of regulations or contract rights, as with trade in sex or 
drugs. 
 
2 ones, and spans domains of activity where the risk and potential harm of error in law 
enforcement varies significantly. 
 
Given rational expectations, the timing of lawmaking matters because agents can better 
estimate their entitlements under regulation than under litigation.  If they could perfectly 
foresee how courts would apply law to given facts, or if their ability to predict application 
of law to their behavior was invariant as between regulation and litigation, there would be 
no difference between litigation and regulation as a result of the timing of lawmaking and 
enforcement.
2  Research on litigation and regulation conceived this way is related to a 
separate line of legal research that also describes trade-offs between ex ante specification 
of law (“rules”) and ex post application of general laws to specific facts (“standards”) 
(Jhering 1883; Ehrlich & Posner 1974).  That literature recognizes that courts sometimes 
develop “rules” that function much as do regulations (e.g., contracts cannot be enforced 
against persons under the age of 18), and emphasizes that such rules specified ex ante – 
whether by courts or regulatory agencies -- increase certainty and reduce the costs of 
legal advice and adjudication ex post, but are more costly to enact (Kaplow 1992) and 
more frequently lead to specific case outcomes that reduce welfare, by being both over- 
and under-inclusive (Kennedy 1986), particularly when they will apply over a broad 
range of behaviors over a long period of time, or where lawmakers’ information is 
limited (Sunstein 1995). 
 
I.A.2.  Regulation of M&A:  Mandatory vs. Default Law 
 
Another use of “regulation” is relevant in the context of corporate and securities laws 
governing M&A.  Legal scholars have long argued over whether those bodies of law are 
or should be mandatory (“regulatory”) or optional (“default” rules) (e.g., Bebchuk 1989).  
Should use of the corporate form -- or the raising of capital from dispersed investors -- 
trigger laws that can be freely tailored through the corporate charter or bylaws or 
contract, or should they be binding?  And if binding, should they be binding with respect 
to issuers other than fraud?  Laws that are “regulatory” in this sense are not necessarily 
clear ex ante rules, and they may require ex post litigation to clarify their meaning as well 
as for enforcement – in effect, the content of key M&A contracts, including the risk of 
litigation, may be imposed by regulation. 
 
                                                 
2 Other differences between the two general modes of lawmaking, such as expertise or political control of 
lawmakers or law enforcers, might still matter.  If judges are generalists, and regulatory agencies 
specialists, for example, the latter may have expertise that may be beneficial (Landis 1938, Glaeser, 
Johnson & Shleifer 2001).  But courts can be (and often are) specialized (e.g., Revesz 1990, who discusses 
12 specialized Federal courts in the US, and Dreyfuss 1995, who discusses the Delaware Chancery Court, 
which specializes in business litigation).  If regulatory agencies are subject to more and courts less political 
control, the latter could more optimally address harms imposed by politically powerful agents on politically 
weak agents (Pace 2007; Cook 2002).  But in the US, at least, many regulatory agencies (e.g., the Federal 
Reserve Board) are arguably subject to weaker political control than judges, who are elected in most states 
Rottman (2000), and precisely the opposite argument has been made in favor of regulation on the ground 
that judges or law enforcers required to impose large ex post fines may be more vulnerable to persuasion or 
bribery (Becker & Stigler 1974, Glaeser & Shleifer 2003). 
 
3 Legal scholars tend to classify laws as mandatory or default formally, based on whether 
they expressly permit companies to “opt out” of their provisions.  But many laws relevant 
to M&A that are, on their face, “regulatory” in this sense can, with some ingenuity and 
effort, be “contracted around.”
3  But “opt outs” of such core elements of corporate law 
are rare US, possibly because of transaction costs, exacerbated by network effects 
(Coates 1999).  In practice, laws that are formally mandatory may not bind, and laws that 
are formally default rules may bind.  Key aspects of M&A law are, in practice, 
“regulatory” in the sense specified above – there are clear ex ante rules that typically 
structure the deal process.  They are not “regulatory” in a formal sense, in that they can 
be contracted around.  But in practice, they rarely are. 
 
An important set of examples for US M&A practice arises from the “fiduciary duties” 
applicable to corporate directors and officers.  Fiduciary duty law is widely thought to 
represent an attempt to supplement private contract not for any of the reasons 
summarized above for regulation, but because detailed specification of contracts ex ante 
is too expensive or in some cases impossible, whether because of imperfect information, 
collective action problems, or both.  Fiduciary duty law is “regulatory” in the sense that, 
in general terms, private parties cannot opt out of it – it is binding on them whether they 
include it in their contracts or not, and often has a moral flavor similar to criminal laws.  
But it is enforced through private litigation ex post in courts; it remains relatively 
unspecified in detailed content until applied to specific facts (is a set of “standards”); and, 
in some particulars, it may be contracted around (e.g., Coates 1999).  An overly strong 
distinction between litigation and regulation as modes of lawmaking may obscure the fact 
that many laws partake of both. 
 
I.B.  Evolution of Laws Over Time 
 
Overlapping with the literature contrasting litigation and regulation is research exploring 
the degree to which particular kinds of laws change of time.  Here, the contrast is made 
between “civil law” – codes and statutes that remain relatively unchanged over time – 
and “common law” – bodies of judicial decisions accompanied by some explanation of 
the principles used to reach specific outcomes that provide a degree (but only a degree) of 
guidance about future cases.  The general relationship to the bodies of research 
summarized above should be apparent.  Civil law is (the output of) regulation; it consists 
of many rules; it changes rarely.  Common law is (the output of) litigation; it consists of 
many standards, made into rules only for purposes of each case as it happens; it changes 
adapts routinely, as every case presents at least some relevant facts that may distinguish it 
from prior cases.    
 
                                                 
3 For example, every US state provides that, with board approval, a majority of shareholders may approve a 
merger with another corporation, and in the merger dissenting shareholders will have a choice of accepting 
the merger consideration or cash at a “fair value” set ex post by a court.  In effect, shareholders can have 
their shares converted into cash by majority vote through merger.  Coates 1999 shows that the risk of such 
ex post litigation can be eliminated by contract.  Further, the ability of a majority of shareholders to force 
through a merger could be eliminated by contract -- a corporate charter could, for example, require 
unanimous shareholder approval of a merger. 
4 One line of research explores whether and how a common law system would tend 
towards efficiency over time and, implicitly, whether and how the common law would 
evolve “rules” out of “standards” (as is commonly asserted or assumed in much legal 
scholarship, e.g., Kaplow 1992).  Posner 1973 claimed appellate judges have personal or 
career incentives to maximize efficiency.  Rubin 1977 proposed inefficient outcomes are 
more likely to be challenged in court, resulting in litigation that over time produces 
efficient laws, even if judges are unaware they are doing so.  Llewellyn 1951 and Posner 
2005 reasoned that even with biased judges the common law would evolve towards 
efficiency because it involves sequential decision-making of judges with diverse 
preferences, which would cancel out over time, although this assumes judges respect 
precedent, to some extent, else there would be no trend over time.  Gennaioli & Shleifer 
2007 suggest that appellate courts in a common law system tend towards efficiency 
because they preserve information by distinguishing current cases from prior decisions.   
 
Other conjectures about the evolution of law can be found in the literatures reviewed 
above.  Sunstein 1995 claims that a system of rules entails “no rapid changes in the 
content of law,” consistent with a common view that civil law is less flexible or adaptable 
than common law, and that regulation tends towards sclerosis.  Rajan & Zingales 1999 
argue that civil law countries (i.e., countries that rely on regulatory agencies subject to 
political controls as their primary means of lawmaking) can undergo more rapid and 
transformative legal changes in response to changes in private interests, than can the 
common law.  This claim could be consistent with claims about regulatory sclerosis if, 
over periods of time, private interests remain stable, producing little change in a 
regulatory system, but occasionally, in response to factor, technological or unrelated 
political shocks, private interests shift suddenly, leading to regulatory change that is more 
rapid and significant than could occur through litigation in a common law system.   
Kennedy 1986 suggests reasons (and offers some qualitative evidence) that rules and 
standards may cycle, evolving into the other over time:  rules evolve into standards as the 
welfare loss commanded by a rule in a given case will induce a court to invent an 
exception, with the exceptions eventually swallowing the rule; conversely, standards 
induce rules, as private parties lobby for (or persuade courts to adopt) rules to assist them 
in planning. 
 
Niblett et al. 2009 provide one of the few empirical tests of some of these claims by 
tracking the evolution of one aspect of US tort law (the economic loss rule) from 1970 to 
2005 and find that while the law did appear to converge towards one version of the rule 
in the first 25 years of their sample period, courts have begun to deviate and splinter in 
their approach to the rule – i.e., the law did not converge to any stable resting point.  This 
paper attempts to provide another empirical test of theories of how common law evolves 
over time, in a different domain. 
 
I.C.  Deal Protection and Break Fees 
 
In both the UK and the US, M&A involving public company targets face a law-derived 
risk of non-completion:  (1) the law requires target shareholders to approve or accept a 
bid, either by tendering or voting; (2) compliance with disclosure and other laws 
5 governing the process of obtaining target shareholder tenders or votes entails delay, 
ranging from a minimum of 30 days up to six months in some situations; and (3) target 
shareholders may decide not to accept or approve a bid for any reason, including a third-
party bid that emerges after agreements for an initial bid are signed.  In effect, an M&A 
agreement or bid gives shareholders of a public target an option to accept the bid, and 
does not effectively bind the target or its shareholders to the bid, even if approved by the 
target’s ordinary agents (i.e., its board or officers). 
 
Deal protection contracts, including break fees, have emerged as a second-best way for 
bidders to protect their reliance interests in pursuing a bid for a public target.  Even if 
they are unable to acquire the target, they can at least get paid a fee, if their bid is rejected 
and (typically) if the target is acquired by a competing bidder.  Unlike the underlying bid, 
the target’s promise to pay a break fee (often included in the deal agreement) is not 
generally subject to shareholder approval, in either the US or the UK.  Targets, in turn, 
agree to break fees – even though they may reduce competitive bids – because they 
encourage bidder participation in the face of valuation uncertainty and bidding costs, 
including significant and difficulty-to-quantify opportunity costs, and compensate a 
bidder for the inevitable release of valuable information to third parties (including 
potential competitors) upon the announcement of a bid for the target.  Targets may also 
use break fees to control a sales process where the failure of that process to produce a 
completed deal can harm the target.  Alternatively, target managers may agree to break 
fees to favor a bidder out of personal interests – better jobs after the deal, higher 
severance pay, or other private benefits.   
 
Prior literature focused on break fees and other forms of deal protection can be found in 
both legal academic writing and in finance scholarship.  In the US, legal scholars have 
long debated whether and when break fees can represent a breach of the duty of loyalty of 
a target’s board of directors.  Prominent theoretical articles in the legal literature include 
Schwartz 1986, who suggested a ban on break fees, to encourage bid competition; Ayres 
1990, who noted that break fees reduce an initial bidders’ valuation of a target as well as 
competing bidders, and would reduce welfare only if they deterred competing bids and 
not if a competing bidder in fact emerged; Fraidin & Hanson 1994, who applied the 
Coase theorem to argue for a permissive attitude towards break fees; and Kahan & 
Klausner 1996, who argued that courts should be more permissive towards break fees that 
induce an initial bid, and more skeptical of those granted to subsequent bidders, 
particularly when solicited by target managers, whose choice of bidder may be biased by 
agency costs.   
 
Empirical research on break fees was initiated by Coates & Subramanian 2001, who 
studied break fees and other forms of deal protection granted by US targets in friendly 
bids for control greater than $50 million in value in the period 1988 to 1999.  They found 
that break fee size was dispersed and grew non-monotonically throughout that period, 
ranging from 1% (25
th percentile) to 3% (75
th percentile) in 1988 and from 2% (25
th) to 
4% (75
th) in 1999, consistent with a potential “Lake Woebegone effect,” in which bidders 
sought a fee that was slightly larger than the average fee in a recent period sample, 
6 producing ever-increasing fees.
4  They also found that fee size correlated with court 
decisions, including 1994 and 1997 Delaware Supreme Court decisions in Paramount 
and Brazen, and with other bid characteristics, including larger bid size and the use of a 
tender offer by the bidder.  They found, finally, in both univariate and multivariate tests, 
that the fact and size of break fees correlated with completion rates, both in general and 
conditional on publicly reported bid competition.   
 
Subsequent research, using US data 1988 to 2000, confirmed their findings, and also 
found that break fees reduce the incidence of subsequent publicly reported competing 
bids, and (using a simultaneous equations system) that deal premiums were higher where 
targets agreed to pay break fees, consistent with the hypothesis that – at least at the fee 
levels observed in the sample period, and conditional on judicial scrutiny, discussed 
below – break fees were on average effective both at reducing bid competition and 
beneficial for target shareholders (Officer 2003, Bates & Lemmon 2001; see also Burch 
2001, who examines deal protection in the form of stock options).  Empirical research on 
break fees has also been reported for Canada (Andre et al. 2007), which reaches similar 
general conclusions, and for Australia (Chapple et al. 2007), which finds that break fees 
in Australia – which must comply with a bright-line rule similar to the one imposed in the 
UK – appear actually to correlate inversely with bid completion, and with bid premiums.  
No studies appear to have been done of break fees in the UK, and none compares break 
fee size or the effects of break fees between the UK and the US. 
 
I.D.  Legal Treatment of Break Fees 
 
Why is deal protection regulated (or the subject of a special type of litigation)?  There are 
three justifications for having special laws for break fees, one from antitrust theory, one 
from agency theory, and one from contract theory.  First, they can deter bids, reduce 
competition, and reduce welfare by allowing the target to be transferred to a lower-
valuing bidder.  In the presence of market power, contracts between a bidder and target 
(such as break fees) can impose externalities on other bidders and reduce social welfare 
because they both deter breach and reduce the benefits of search (see Diamond & Maskin 
1979; Aghion & Bolton 1987).  Second, for public targets, the “owners” of the target are 
dispersed shareholders, who cannot effectively represent themselves in the sales process.  
Target managers effectively choose among bidders in the first instance, subject to 
shareholder approval.  Target manager preferences over bidders, moreover, can be 
expected to systematically differ from those of target shareholders.  Traditional fiduciary 
duty law would thus constrain, to some extent, target managers’ ability to use break fees 
to favor one bidder over another, absent a justification, particularly if the target managers 
                                                 
4 Boone & Mulherin 2006 find (and Andre et al. 2007 confirm) that Thomson’s data on break fee incidence 
is biased in several respects:  first, there is a general underreporting of fees and other forms of deal 
protection, relative to what is revealed by a careful review of SEC filings; second, there is a greater 
underreporting earlier in time, creating the spurious impression of time trends in fee incidence; and third, 
there is greater underreporting for smaller bids, creating the spurious impression of a relationship between 
toeholds and break fees.  Since these biases emerge from underreporting by Thomson, they should not 
affect data on fee size, since such data is only available where Thomson reports fee data.  They also 
confirm the finding, reported in Coates & Subramanian 2001, that fee incidence increased significantly 
after the 1994 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Paramount.   
7 had some evident tangible interest in the choice, such as a better job or severance 
package.  Third and finally, there is a broader justification rooted in the basic structure of 
corporate law common to the UK and its former colonies, which is that a fee cannot be so 
large as to essentially eliminate the option target shareholders have to accept or reject the 
bid.  Put differently, even if there is no specific concern about target managers in the 
context of a particular bid, a law permitting any and all break fees to be enforced would 
crucially undermine more generally laws requiring shareholder consent for sale of the 
company.  One can view limits on break fees as reflecting an implicit term in the 
underlying contract between a target and its investors.  Those more general laws can be 
justified either on contract grounds – they were part of the bargain by virtue of being part 
of corporate law at the time investors purchased stock in a company – and on efficiency 
grounds – shareholder approval or consent requirements constrain agency costs in 
general, even if they are unnecessary or even inefficiently costly for a given company 
with given managers in the context of a given bid.  For any or all of these reasons, the 
law in each of the US and the UK constrains break fees.  But it does so differently in each 
nation. 
 
I.D.1.  UK Regulation of Break Fees 
 
In the UK, break fees are constrained in theory by three sets of laws, but in practice only 
two are binding, and both have identical effects (Davies et al. 2004; Montgomery et al. 
2005).  The Takeover Code limits break fees to one percent of the value of the bid.
5  That 
Code was originally a set of rules self-imposed by major institutional participants in the 
City, including representatives of the Bank of England, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), leading merchant banks, and organizations representing institutional investors, 
and is now statutorily binding on all tender offers for public companies in the UK, by 
virtue of the UK’s implementation of the EU-wide Takeover Directive.
6  Prior to 2006, 
the Takeover Code did not formally have the force of law, but was practically binding 
(Armour & Skeel 2007; Tarbert 2003), in part because UK courts deferred to its 
judgments because they recognized that the UK’s formal regulatory bodies (the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Bank of England) had sponsored its 
formation.
7  The direct sanction for flouting its requirements was expulsion from the LSE 
                                                 
5 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code § 21.2. 
6 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/05, 2004 O.J. (L142) 12 (EC), art. 4 (supervisory 
authorities may include private bodies recognised by national law, such as the Takeover Panel), 9 (target 
board obligations include not taking frustrating actions, including limits on break fees); The Takeovers 
Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations 2006, 2006 S.I. 2006/1183 (Eng.), available at 
www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2006/20061183.htm (transitional provisions); Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§942-65 
(Eng.), statute giving Takeover Panel authority to write Takeover Code, and its Hearing Committee 
authority to give binding rulings on its application). 
7 Regina v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin Plc., 1987 Q.B. 815, 838-39 (C.A.) (The 
Panel's "source of power is only partly based upon moral persuasion and the assent of institutions and their 
members, the bottom line being the statutory powers exercised by the Department of Trade and Industry 
and the Bank of England.  In this context I should be very disappointed if the courts could not recognize the 
realities of executive power and allowed their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes 
complexity of the way in which it can be exerted."). 
8 and trade organizations representing institutional investors, disinvestment by the British 
institutional investor community (who were required by the terms of the Code to divest 
from anyone breaking the Code), and an inability to obtain services or other assistance 
from others subject to the Code.  In essence, Code enforcement piggy-backed on private 
organizations and relationships that would be considered essential for ongoing business 
activities in the UK.   
 
Currently, the Takeover Panel, responsible for interpreting and resolving disputes under 
the Takeover Code, includes members nominated by trade organizations of insurance 
companies, investment companies, investment managers and brokers, commercial and 
investment bankers, industrial companies, accountants, and pension funds, and those 
members also constitute a majority of the members of the Hearing Committee, which 
hears disputes and imposes sanctions under the Code.
8  It is thus an “expert” regulatory 
body.  But as long as it retains its public, bright-line character and is backed by the threat 
of significant sanctions, UK law on break fees functions as a self-enforcing bright-line 
rule that requires no ongoing expertise.  (In principle, the Takeover Panel could raise or 
lower the cap over time, in response to changing market conditions or evidence regarding 
the welfare or other effects of break fees, but they have not done so in the 10 years since 
the rule was first formally adopted.
9  Few if any disputes concerning the rule’s 
application to conventional break fees, and the rule can only be deviated from with 
advance permission of that same body, which reportedly they rarely grant.  (These 
statements are consistent with the data discussed in Part II below.)  
 
A second law – the Companies Act – has long forbidden public companies in the UK 
from providing “financial assistance” to anyone purchasing their shares, including in the 
context of a takeover bid.
10  “Financial assistance” for this purpose includes any 
contingent payment to the bidder by the target, with certain exceptions.  Break fees are 
covered, unless they are less than one percent of the bid value.  Violations of the law 
could result in civil and even criminal penalties for any officer or director of the target 
that approved the violation.  Thus, even if a bidder would be prepared to endure 
expulsion from the UK financial community in order to obtain a break fee larger than one 
percent, targets risk significant sanctions if they agree.  Agreements for such fees would 
also be unenforceable in UK courts, making it risky for a bidder to rely on an agreement 
for such a fee, even if a target were willing to risk sanctions.  Unlike the Takeover Code, 
the Companies Act was adopted as a general statute by Parliament, and to that degree 
differs from the modal form of regulation described above.  But as with the Takeover 
Code, the Companies Act provisions as applied to break fees appear to function in 
practice as a set of rules, with the ex ante character of regulation, and generate few 
disputes and little litigation (Davies et al. 2004). 
                                                 
8 See http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership. 
9 Takeover Panel, Inducement Fees, Panel Statement 1999/10 (7/16/1999), available at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1999-10.pdf; see also Takeover Panel, 
Practice Statement No. 23, Rule 21.2 – Inducement Fee Agreements and Other Agreements Between an 
Offeror and the Offerree Company (7/10/2008). 
10 Companies Act 2006 (c. 46), Part 18, Chapter 2; Companies Act 1985 §§ 151-158. 
9  
Third, and unimportantly in the UK, there are general fiduciary duty obligations, 
enforced in a common law fashion by the UK courts.  Because the Takeover Code and 
Companies Act provisions described above effectively rule out legally controversial 
break fees, no competing bidders have sought an injunction or other judicial remedy as a 
result of a break fee on fiduciary duty grounds.  In short, ex ante bright-line UK 
regulation of break fees by an expert body, supplemented by a statute establishing the 
legal authority of that body, has crowded out break fee litigation and the use of ex post 
standards in practice, even if they remain formally available. 
 
I.D.2.  US Law on Break Fees 
 
In the US, there is no equivalent to the UK Takeover Code or the statutory UK ban on 
“financial assistance.”  Nor are break fees constrained by Federal law.  Instead, the only 
legal constraints are the general fiduciary duties imposed on target directors and officers 
by state corporate law enforced through litigation (Coates & Subramanian 2001).  Target 
shareholders – including a competing bidder that purchases a single share of the target – 
have standing to sue in court on the ground that the agreement to pay a break fee was 
disloyal, grossly negligent, or both.  While courts typically defer to the “business 
judgment” of a company’s board in such cases, if the bidder can plausibly argue that the 
fee was designed to favor incumbent managers, it will often be able to get a court to 
scrutinize the facts surrounding the fee agreement.  The standard directly applicable to 
“deal protection” in the leading US jurisdiction (Delaware) – a break fee is permissible if 
it induces a bid and impermissible if it forecloses bidding
11 – but nearly all fees have the 
potential to do both, that formal standard provides little guidance to practitioners, and 
courts review many other facts in reviewing fees.  One relevant consideration, but only 
one, will be the size of the fee.  Other factors, such as the target board’s plausible 
interests in favoring a particular bidder, the information they had at the time they granted 
the fee, the process that preceded the grant of the fee provision, and the size of 
comparable fees in comparable transactions, will all generally be considered by the 
reviewing court, in a typically fact-intensive fiduciary duty case.
12   
 
Because there is no bright-line rule setting a maximum amount for break fees in the US, 
bidders or target shareholders unhappy with a given fee must seek to attack it ex post, in 
court, without any assurance as to the outcome.  Bidders that want break fees must 
negotiate for them without knowing precisely how large the fee can be without risking a 
court finding that it represents a breach of the target’s fiduciary’s duties.  (Courts view a 
                                                 
11 QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., Del. Ch., 635 A.2d 1245 (1993), aff'd, Del. 
Supr., 637 A.2d 34, 50 (1994) (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Del. Supr. 506 
A.2d 173, 179 (1986) and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (1988)). 
 
12 E.g., Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, Del.Ch. 
(Chandler, C.), February 23, 2007 (No. Civ. A. 2635-N, Civ. A. 2663-N) (listing a number of factors to be 
considered in evaluating break fees). 
10 bidder as participating in any violation represented by an agreed-upon fee, so a bidder 
may not claim an entitlement arising from a breach by the target’s directors.
13)   
 
The courts reviewing the claims can be state (judges typically elected for terms) or 
federal (appointed judges with life tenure), and typically have “general jurisdiction” – 
they do not specialize in M&A.  In the leading US jurisdiction for M&A law (Delaware), 
however, the reviewing court will be the Court of Chancery, which specializes to a large 
extent in corporate law cases, including M&A and deal protection.  While there is no 
requirement that plaintiffs sue in Delaware when a Delaware target’s directors are alleged 
to have breached their fiduciary duties, the data presented in Figure 2 below show that 
specialized Delaware courts retains a “market share” roughly in line with Delaware’s 
share of public companies generally.  On mode of regulation, then, the US thus uses a 
part-hybrid model:  ex post review through litigation in courts which, more than half of 
the time, have specialized knowledge. 
 
I.D.3.  Why the Divergence? 
 
Why have the US and the UK diverged in their treatment of break fees?  In both 
countries, law on break fees emerges from the law on hostile takeovers, despite the 
relatively minor role that hostile takeovers now play in the US.  In the UK, break fees 
were attacked in the mid-1980s as a type of “frustrating action” by a target that was 
prohibited in general terms by the Takeover Code in force then and now.  In the US, 
break fees were attacked as violations of the target’s fiduciary duties, which are given 
heightened scrutiny by courts in the takeover context.  Both countries adapted their pre-
existing systems for governing hostile takeovers and target responses to the growth in the 
use of break fees, despite the fact that most break fees are not used primarily in the 
context of hostile takeovers.   
 
That explanation, of course, only begs the question:  why do the UK and the US approach 
hostile takeovers differently?  Part of that history has been told by Armour & Skeel 2007, 
drawing on interviews and newspaper accounts.  Here is a summary:  When hostile bids 
emerged in the 1950s, they received negative press, but opinion was insufficient to result 
in legislation or regulation, leaving them to the courts.  Targets began to use defenses that 
were controversial for interfering with what were perceived as shareholder rights, but not 
so extreme as to lead courts to set aside their traditional reluctance to interfere with the 
business judgment of corporate boards.  In the UK, institutional shareholders were more 
significant than in the US, and more organized, facing lower costs for collective political 
action (Olson 1965).  Legislative intervention posed political risks extending beyond 
M&A to economic regulation generally, so institutions and the financial community 
preempted Parliament by developing a self-regulatory body, with the implicit backing of 
the UK government.  In the US, by contrast, corporate managers were more politically 
powerful than shareholders, and the only Federal legislation to be proposed (the Williams 
Act) was intended to restrict takeovers, not takeover defenses.  Although a pre-existing 
                                                 
13 E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 55 (Del. 1994). 
11 regulatory agency (the SEC) was able to lobby for a more neutral, disclosure-oriented 
takeover statute, defenses were largely left to the states to govern with ex post litigation. 
 
This capsule comparative history of takeover governance suggests the contrast between 
the UK’s regulatory approach and the US’s litigation approach is less stark than in the 
narrow case of break fees.  That is because the UK Code, while bright-line with respect to 
break fees, is full of standards as applied to takeovers generally, and has generated a 
substantial body of litigation.  But most of this “litigation” is of a different character than 
true in US courts, in three respects.  First, it does not involve lawyers.  Second, partly due 
to not involving lawyers, it is faster.  Third, partly due to being faster, it takes place ex 
ante, before a given action that might create a conflict occurs – bidders and targets go to 
the Panel to ask permission for a given action, and the Panel decides whether they can.  
In essence, the UK has in general formalized a means to combine the benefits of certainty 
that come from ex ante regulation with the benefits of tailoring that come from ex post 
standards.  But as applied to break fees, they have chosen a much starker form of ex ante 
regulation. 
 
Part II.  Hypotheses and Data on Break Fees in the US and the UK 
 
II.A.  Hypotheses 
 
The following hypotheses, drawn from the literatures just reviewed, can be tested against 
the samples described below.  First, if break fee law binds in the US and the UK, then 
one would expect:   
 
Hypothesis 1.  UK break fees will not exceed 1% of bid value. 
Hypothesis 2.  US break fees will vary more than UK break fees. 
Hypothesis 3.  UK bids will encounter little if any break fee litigation. 
Hypothesis 4.  US bids will encounter more break fee litigation. 
 
Further, if break fee law binds, if the demand for break fees varies from bid to bid, if the 
modal demand for a break fee would result (but for law) in a fee greater than 1% being 
agreed between a bidder and target, then one would expect: 
 
Hypothesis 5.  UK break fees will cluster at 1%. 
Hypothesis 6.  US break fees will typically exceed 1%. 
 
Turning to time trends, if “common law” courts in the US develop rules out of standards 
over time, and improve law with repeated disputes, then one would expect: 
 
Hypothesis 7.  US break fee litigation would diminish over time. 
Hypothesis 8.  US break fees themselves would exhibit less variation over time, 
as applicable law became more certain and practitioners conformed 
to legal norms. 
 
12 Finally, if US fees exceed 1% on average, as predicted by hypothesis 6, then one would 
also expect: 
 
Hypothesis 9.  Post-bid competition will be higher in the UK than in the US. 
Hypothesis 10.  Bid completion rates will be lower in the UK than in the US. 
Hypothesis 11.  Bid incidence will be lower in the UK than in the US. 
 
II.B. Descriptions of Samples 
 
The foregoing hypotheses are tested using four samples.  The first sample – on break fees 
and bid activity -- is drawn from Thomson Financial’s M&A Database.  All bids for UK 
or US targets in the time period 1989 through 2008 are initially sampled (n= 17,977).  
Because bid techniques (including deal protection) vary by deal size (see Coates & 
Subramanian 2001), because deal size may vary between the UK and the US, and 
because bid size has varied over time, the sample is then constrained to consist of bids 
over a $1 billion, which is roughly the 90
th percentile of bid size in 1989 – this paper 
refers to these bids as “large bids” for convenience. (None of the qualitative findings 
reported below depend on the precise size cut-off.)  This produces a total of 5,171 bids.   
 
Bids that are reported by Thomson as still pending – i.e., bids with no effective date or 
withdrawal date – are dropped, leaving 4,404 bids.  Of those, Thomson classifies 865 as 
“hostile,” meaning the target publicly resisted the bid.  Because a target’s consent is 
required to obtain standard deal protection, deal protection is less likely to be found in 
hostile bids, and they are dropped.
14  Of the remaining bids, 194 bids sought less than a 
controlling interest, and are accordingly dropped.  Because banks and other financial 
institutions are generally cash- and capital-constrained, making conventional cash break 
fees difficult or impossible to pay (see Coates and Subramanian 2001 for a discussion and 
evidence in the US context); while economic substitutes are available (e.g., stock or asset 
options), they are regulated differently than break fees, at least in the US.  Bids for targets 
with SIC codes 6000-6999 (n=766) are dropped.  These procedures leave a total of 2,579 
bids.  Of those, Thomson reports stock price and premium data for only 1,346, consisting 
of 209 bids for UK companies and 1,136 bids for US companies.  This subsample is the 
focus of the remaining analysis,
15 and represents ~50% of the total friendly control bid 
volume for non-financial targets in the US and UK over the past 20 years. 
 
A second “placebo” sample used to test the robustness of the findings from the main 
M&A sample, consists of resolved bids dropped from Thomson because they sought less 
than a control interest (including non-control bids for financial institutions).  This sample 
                                                 
14 There are, in fact, more hostile bids as a share of large bids in the UK (7% of the broader sample of large 
bids) than in the US (3%, p-value < .01).  But as noted at the outset, there are many more friendly deals in 
each country.  Break fees are also much less common in the dropped hostile bids (13%) than in the retained 
friendly bids (37%).  Rossi & Volpin 2007 report fewer hostile bids in the UK (4.4% of listed firms versus 
6.4% in the US) for a sample that includes smaller bids. 
15 More UK bids lack premium data (58%) than US bids (51%), but the basic results discussed below 
regarding incidence and size of break fees, and their relationships with bid completion and bid competition, 
are not qualitatively affected by retaining all large non-pending friendly control bids for non-bank targets. 
13 is by construction not likely to be affected by break fee law, since the reason for break 
fees is to constrain competition in control bids.  
 
The third sample consists of all control bids (i.e., all bids for more than 50% of the target) 
for companies listed on the main stock exchanges in the US (Amex, NYSE, and Nasdaq) 
and the UK (London).  This sample is use to estimate annual bid incidence in each nation, 
normalized by the annual numbers of firms listed on each nation’s stock exchanges, 
which are taken from the World Federation of Exchanges, which reports that data for the 
years 1990-2008. 
 
The fourth sample, on break fee litigation, is drawn from a search of the Westlaw “all 
cases” database for reported judicial opinions on fiduciary duty disputes involving break 
fees in the period 1989-2009.  The search returned 225 reported case decisions that 
mention both mergers or tender offers and “break fee” or synonymous phrases.
16  A 
review of those decisions shows that a third – the 61 cases listed in Appendix A – were in 
cases concerned with the legitimacy of M&A break fees, either on their own or in 
combination with other claimed facts supporting a claim for breach of the target 
fiduciaries’ duties.
17  Grossed up to account for cases not generating reported decisions, a 
rough estimate of break fee litigation in the US in that period would be ~95 cases.
18
 
II.C.  Summary Data and Simple Comparisons of Large Bids in the US and the UK 
 
As shown in Table 1, 88% of large US and UK bids were completed, the rest withdrawn.  
Average (median) bid size was $4.9 billion ($2.1 billion).  Mean (median) duration of a 
completed bid was 145 (114) days.  Bids were at an average (median) premium over the 
prior day’s target stock price of 30% (26%).  Break fees – again, including US and UK 
bids – were used in 70% of bids,
19 and were an average (median) of 2.6% (2.7%) of deal 
value.
20  In nominal dollars, the average break fee was $124 million; the largest was $3.9 
                                                 
16 A search of Westlaw’s all cases database (including both Federal and state courts), using the search 
phrase “(merger or ‘tender offer’) and (‘break fee’ or “bust-up fee’ or ‘break-up fee’ or ‘termination fee’) 
and ‘fiduciary duty’” returned 224 cases. 
17 The 61 cases concerned with break fees are listed in Appendix A.  The rest consist of cases in bankruptcy 
courts, which govern break fees differently than in normal bids; reverse termination fee cases, which 
involve fees payable by bidders rather than targets; disclosure cases; cases involving “termination fees” in 
unrelated contexts that happen to mention “merger” or “tender offer”; cases in which break fees are 
mentioned in passing, and cases not involving fiduciary duty claims.  Of those cases, 34 were reported by 
Delaware courts, roughly 67% the sample over the whole period, in line with Delaware’s market share of 
US public companies (Coates 2001).  However, as illustrated in Figure 1, Delaware’s “market share” of 
break fee cases has declined in recent years, from an average of 95% from 1989 through 1998, to 57% from 
1999 to 2008. 
18 While reported decisions do not represent all cases filed, the multiple of complaints-to-reported-decisions 
is not as large as one might think:  Thomas & Thompson 2004 report 348 fiduciary duty cases were filed in 
Delaware Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000; a search for “fiduciary duty” in the Westlaw Delaware cases 
database returns 224 reported decisions for the same time period.   
19 But see Boone & Mulherin 2006 on underreporting of break fees in Thomson’s database. 
20 Thomson reports “deal value,” defined to include the “total consideration paid,” including liabilities 
assumed if disclosed, excluding fees and expenses.  Thomson also reports “enterprise value” and “rank 
14 billion.  While these fees may seem small relative to bid size, it should be remembered 
that the best evidence about the expected effect of M&A bids on bidder share prices is 
that they are close to zero, often negative, and at most increase bidder share prices by 0-
2% (Andrade et al. 2001).  While buyers are typically larger than targets, moving from a 
1% to a 3% fee could substantially erode or even wipe out the expected net benefit of a 
bid for a typical prospective competing bidder.   
 
Bid size between the two nations was similar:  $4.7 billion in the UK, on average, versus 
$5.0 billion in the US.  Bids using stock consideration were larger than cash bids, but this 
was true in both nations.  Yet, as reflected in Table 1, break fees were significantly 
smaller and vary less in the UK than in the US.  In the US, 95% of break fees were 
greater than one percent, the maximum for the UK.  Over 60% of the UK fees fall 
between 0.9% and 1.1%; less than 2% of fees in the US fall in that range.  The standard 
deviation of UK break fee size is less than a third of that in the US.  Consistent with 
hypothesis 5, UK break fees are left skewed (-1.7), and less peaked (kurtosis = 5.0), 
whereas US break fees are much less skewed (0.6), and are more peaked (kurtosis = 8.9).  
In short, at all moments of the distribution, UK and US break fees differ as predicted, as 
reflected on Figure 1. 
                                                                                                                                                 
value,” which attempt to reflect debt and other claims against the target or the acquiror after the bid 
differently, as well as “equity value,” which is simply the pre-bid equity market capitalization of the target.  
The qualitative findings presented below persist regardless of whether break fees are calculated as a 
percentage of deal value, equity value, enterprise value, or rank value.  The remainder of this paper uses 
“deal value” as the basis for the calculation of break fees, but uses the term “bid value” to reflect the fact 
that not all bids in the dataset are completed. 
15  
Figure 1 
In nominal dollars, the average agreed-upon UK fee was $41 million, a third the size of 
the average US break fee, at $128 million; the largest agreed-upon fee in the UK was 
$212 million, in the 2007 buyout of Alliance Boots, compared to the largest US fee, the 
$3.9 billion fee agreed to in the 2000 stock merger of Time-Warner and AOL.  Among 
withdrawn bids, where the fee would typically have been required to be paid, the average 
fee in the UK was $25 million, 15% of the size of the average triggered in the US ($184 
million), and the largest paid triggered in the UK was a mere $35 million, in the 2000 
acquisition of Lasmo by Amerada Hess, compared to the largest fee triggered in the US, 
the $1.8 billion paid in the 2000 acquisition of Warner-Lambert by Pfizer.   
 
16 Table 1.   
 
Summary Statistics, All Bids and US vs. UK Bids Over $1 billion, 1989-2008 
 Mean  (standard 
deviation) for  
all bids (n=1346) 
 Mean  (standard 








test of means  
(US vs. UK) 
% sought in bid  98.5 (6.4)  97.3% (7.6)  98.7% (6.2)  0.01 
Bid value ($mm)  4.9  (9.9)  4.7 (8.6)  5.0 (10.2)  0.72 
% bid premium over 1-day 
prior market price 
29.8 (28.0)  30.0 (29.2)  29.8 (27.8)  0.91 
% with break fees
21 70.4 (45.7)  18.7 (38.7)  70.3 (40.1)  0.00 
Break fee as % of bid value  2.6 (1.0)  0.9 (0.3)  2.6 (1.0)  0.00 
% using tender offer  26.9 (44.4)  72.2 (44.7)  18.6 (38.9)  0.00 
% cash bids  56.7 (49.6)  65.1 (47.8)   55.1 (49.8)  0.01 
% stock bids  28.0 (44.9)  5.3 (22.4)  32.1 (46.7)  0.00 
% cross-border  19.9 (39.9)  36.8 (48.3)  16.9 (37.4)  0.00 
% bidder and target in same 
industry (one-digit SIC) 
63.4 (48.1)  52.4 (50.1)  65.4 (47.6)  0.00 
Duration of completed bids  
in days 
145 (107)  128 (82)  148 (111)  0.02 
 
US bids took longer to complete than UK bids.  The reason for the timing difference has 
to do with the interaction of law – stock deals require a more lengthy regulatory process 
in both nations, due to disclosure and registration requirements – and bid financing, 
which is weighted more towards cash in the UK than in the US.   Specifically, UK bids 
are most frequently for all cash (65%) than for all stock (5%) or for other securities or a 
blend of deal currencies (30%).  While large US bids are also most commonly for all cash 
(55%), they are more frequently for stock (32%) than in the UK, with the rest for other 
securities or a blend of deal currencies (13%).  Each pair-wise difference is statistically 
significant at a p-value of <.01.  As shown in Table 2, cash bids take roughly the same 
amount of time in both countries.  UK bids were also more likely to involve an overlap 
between a bidder’s and a target’s one-digit SIC code, even in cash bids. 
 
                                                 
21 But see Boone & Mulherin 2006 on underreporting of break fees in Thomson’s database. 
17 Table 2.   
 
Summary Statistics, Cash Bids in US vs. Cash Bids in UK, 1989-2008 
   Mean for  
UK cash bids (n=209) 
Mean for  
US cash bids (n=1137) 
p-value of t-
test of means 
(US vs. UK 
cash bids) 
% sought in bid  96.4%  98.4%  0.00 
Bid value ($mm)  4.1  4.2  0.93 
% bid premium over 1-day prior 
market price 
29.8 29.9  0.96 
% with break fees
22 26.4 80.3  0.00 
Break fee as % of bid value  0.9  2.7  0.00 
% using tender offer  72.1  28.6  0.00 
% cross-border  35.3  21.3  0.00 
% bidder and target in same industry 
(one-digit SIC) 
44.4   56.4  0.01 
Duration of completed bids  
in days 
126 133  0.44 
 
II.D.  Trends in Break Fee Size 
 
Trends in the size of break fees in the US and the UK are presented in Table 3.  As 
previously reported in Coates & Subramanian 2001 (for a sample including smaller deals 
than reported on in this paper), break fees increased over the course of the 1990s in the 
US.  However, any trend in US break fees in large deals appears to have moderated in the 
2000s.  As a more formal test, break fee size as a percent of bid value is regressed against 
the bid announcement date, and against bid announcement date, a dummy indicating that 
the year of announcement is after 1999, and the interaction of announcement date and the 
year 1999.  In both regressions (unreported), bid announcement date correlates strongly 
with break fee size, but the signs on post-1999 and date*1999 interaction are negative 
and statistically insignificant.   
 
By comparison, there is no marked time trend in break fees in the UK – other than the 
initial jump from no fees to 1% fees in 1999, the same year that the Takeover Panel 
approved 1% fees through rule-making. While break fees were used on occasion in the 
UK prior to the 2000s, they were sufficiently suspect – viewed as potentially a type of 
“frustrating action” barred by the UK Takeover Code – that they did not occur frequently 
in the 1990s, and only began to appear regularly after they were implicitly legitimized by 
the adoption of the 1% cap in 1999.
23  Thus, the idea that the UK experienced a 
regulatory “shock” a la Rajan & Zingales 1999 – the 1% rule not only capped fees but 
                                                 
22 But see Boone & Mulherin 2006 on underreporting of break fees in Thomson’s database. 
23 This statement is based less on the data in Thomson, which is unreliable on break fee incidence, and 
more on statements in practitioner commentary on break fees (Davies et al. 2004, Montgomery et al. 2005, 
Tarbert 2003), and the general absence of such commentary prior to 2000.  Technically, break fees in deals 
structured not as tender offers but amalgamations or restructurings would not be subject to the Takeover 
Code, but the Code’s approval of 1% fees seems to have increased used of such fees in that types of deals 
as well, as reflected in the general norm of 1% of firm value followed by M&A practitioners under the 
Companies Act’s exception for immaterial financial assistance.  See Davies et al. 2004. 
18 made them legitimate, increasing their use – is consistent with practitioner reports and the 
fact that already in 2000, break fees already are clustering in the UK near the legal cap of 
1%, and remain there throughout the sample period.  In only one year – 2005 – are there 
any reported break fees in excess of 1.0%, and that one outlier is an erroneous datum in 
Thomson, which lists PetroKhazakhstan as a UK target, when it fact it was Canadian.   In 
unreported regressions, there is no relationship of break fee size on bid announcement 
date over any part of the sample period.   
 
Table 3.  Trends in Break Fee Size, US vs. UK, 1989-2008 
 UK  US 
  Mean Median  Mean Median 
1989  -- -- 1.5%  1.0% 
1990  -- -- 2.6%  2.6% 
1991  -- -- 3.0%  3.0% 
1992  -- -- 1.6%  1.2% 
1993  -- -- 2.1%  2.1% 
1994  -- -- 2.3%  2.2% 
1995  -- -- 2.2%  2.4% 
1996  -- -- 2.5%  2.5% 
1997  -- -- 2.5%  2.5% 
1998  -- -- 2.4%  2.5% 
1999  0.7% 0.7% 2.4% 2.6% 
2000  0.9% 0.9% 3.0% 2.8% 
2001  -- -- 2.7%  2.7% 
2002  0.4% 0.4% 2.8% 2.8% 
2003  -- -- 3.0%  3.2% 
2004  1.0% 1.0% 2.8% 3.0% 
2005  1.5% (0.8%)  1.0% (0.8%)  2.6%  2.8% 
2006  0.7% 0.8% 2.8% 2.9% 
2007  1.0% 1.0% 2.7% 2.9% 
2008  1.0% 1.0% 2.9% 2.8% 
-- = no observed break fees; for 2005, the UK fee statistics are listed as derived directly from Thomson, and 
in parentheses as corrected after dropping a misclassified target (see text) 
 
Table 4 depicts trends in variation of break fee size in the UK and in the US in available 
years, showing the inter-quartile difference (i.e., the 75
th percentile sized fee for the year 
less the 25
th percentile sized fee) and the annual standard deviation in break fee size, as a 
percentage of bid value.  In all years but 2005, both measures of variation of fee size are 
more than double for the US than for the UK, and sometimes much larger, than its 
counterpart in the UK.  After dropping the misclassified deal discussed above, the same is 
true for 2005.  There do not seem to be any trends in the variation in the US data:  despite 
years of experience, thousands of deals, and hundreds of lawsuits (discussed below), 
there remains as much variation in observed break fee size in the early 1990s as there is 
in the late 2000s.  
 
19 Table 4.  Trends in Variation in Break Fee Size, US vs. UK, 1989-2008 
  Interquartile Range of Break Fee Size  Standard Deviation of Break Fee Size 
 UK  US  UK  US 
1989 --  0.01066  -- 0.00752 
1990 --  0.02620  -- -- 
1991 --  0.00000  -- 0.01525 
1992 --  0.01965  -- 0.01563 
1993 --  0.01536  -- 0.00820 
1994 --  0.00980  -- 0.00895 
1995 --  0.00738  -- 0.00736 
1996 --  0.01055  -- 0.00846 
1997 --  0.00916  -- 0.00938 
1998 --  0.00995  -- 0.00877 
1999 0.00000  0.01063  -- 0.00932 
2000 0.00000  0.00878  -- 0.01194 
2001 0.00000  0.01258  -- 0.00931 
2002 0.00000  0.01151  -- 0.00756 
2003 0.00000  0.01163  -- 0.01179 
2004 0.00069  0.01314  0.00048 0.00809 
2005  0.02523 (0.00556)  0.01062  0.01325 (0.00393)  0.00766  
2006 0.00435  0.00815  0.00314 0.00699 
2007 0.00060  0.00940  0.00247 0.00812 
2008 0.00158  0.00951  0.00087 0.00850 
-- = insufficient observations; for 2005, the UK fee statistics are listed as derived directly from Thomson, 
and in parentheses as corrected after dropping a misclassified target (see text) 
 
As an alternative measure, break fee size was regressed separately against industry 
controls (one-digit SIC codes) and the observed deal characteristics used in the 
multivariate regressions described below (use of cash consideration, tender offer, cross-
border deals, and bid value).  Given the paucity of reported break fees in the UK prior to 
2000, this regression was run for the subsample consisting of years after 1999, although 
the qualitative result is the same without this restriction.  For the UK, this (unreported) 
regression has an R-squared of 26%; for the US, it is only 6%. 
 
In litigation, this variation in the US fees means that defendant fiduciaries will truthfully 
be able to list a number of billion-dollar bids with fees well above the average – eight 
over 5% since 2000 in this sample, for example.  Since break fees decrease as a 
percentage of bid size as bid size increases in this and other samples, a larger set of 
examples of 5+% break fees can be assembled by defendants in smaller, more typical US 
bids than those in this sample. US case law – reviewed briefly in Part III below – 
suggests it may suffice to defend a fee to show simply that it is not an outlier, and not 
satisfy the more difficult test that it is in line with overall averages.  If so, then this 
variation will make it easier for defendants to prevail in US court challenges to fees, even 
if they have to incur costs to do so. 
 
In sum, the data show that M&A break fees in practice vary significantly more in the US 
than in the UK, consistent with the litigation-driven US law in practice providing less 
clear guidance than UK regulation on the appropriate size of break fees relative to bid 
value.  Given the clarity of the UK rule (the one percent cap), and the varied messages 
US courts have stated regarding the appropriate size of break fees, US deal-makers have 





III.A.  Outcomes:  Bid Competition, Bid Completion, and Bid Litigation 
 
If break fees had no impact on bid outcomes, the differences between law and break fee 
size described above might be of practical importance to bid participants, but little overall 
significance.  However, prior research has found that large break fees can have an impact 
on whether a given bid will attract competition, and on whether that bid will be 
completed.  The difference in legal approaches to break fees – with the UK fees being 
kept below one percent and those in the US typically exceeding double that level or more 
– has a potential effect on allocational efficiency, as higher-valuing bidders in the UK are 
more likely to acquire a target than in the US, while bidders overall in the UK must take 
into account the risk that they will lose reliance interests (net of break fees) if they are 
outbid by competitors, whereas in the US that risk is substantially lower.  The choice 
between regulation and litigation, in other words, may have an effect on bid incidence 
and the efficiency of the bid process.  In addition, the ex ante and ex post approaches to 
governance can be expected to have another set of consequences:  higher litigation costs 
for the latter.  This section explores whether these effects can be observed in the large bid 
break fee data.  
 
III.B.  Univariate Results:  Bid Competition and Bid Completion 
 
As shown in Table 5 (Panel A), UK bids are more than twice as likely to encounter 
competing bids than bids for US targets.  UK bids are less likely to be completed than US 
bids.  This difference is attributable to the presence of competing bids, as the completion 
rate is statistically the same for both countries for bids with competition, or for bids 
without competition, with bids being completed less than 60% of the time in the presence 
of competition, and roughly 90% of the time without competition.  For bids overall, it is 
the competition rate that is different, rather than the way that bidders compete conditional 
on competition.  Similarly, bids are much less likely to encounter post-announcement 
competition if protected by a fee greater than 1% than by a fee of less than 1% (20.6% vs. 
7.9%, p-value <0.001), and much more likely to be completed if protected by such a fee 
(91.4% vs. 82.5%, p-value <0.01). 
 
21 Table 5.   
 
Outcomes for Large Bids in the US and UK, 1989-2008 
Panel A:  All bids  UK bids  US bids   p-value  
% with public bid competition  19.6     (n=209)  8.0      (n=1137)  0.00 
% with litigation   0.0       (n=209)  5.0      (n=1137)  0.00 
% completed  82.8     (n=209)  88.8    (n=1137)  0.01 
without competition  88.6     (n=168)  91.7    (n=1046)  0.20 
with competition  58.5     (n=41)  56.0    (n=91)  0.79 
      
Panel B:  Cash bids  UK cash bids  US cash bids  p-value  
% with public bid competition  22.8     (n=209)  10.0      (n=1137)  0.00 
% with litigation   0.0       (n=209)  3.9        (n=1137)  0.02 
% completed  79.4     (n=209)  88.5      (n=1137)  0.00 
without competition  84.7     (n=105)  91.8      (n=564)  0.02 
with competition  61.3     (n=31)  58.7      (n=63)  0.81 
 
One might wonder, based on the differences in bid consideration and bid duration 
presented above, whether it is those differences that are affecting competition rates.  On 
reflection, however, those differences only make the contrast between bid completion 
rates in the US and the UK even more striking.  The longer a bid takes to be completed, 
the longer third parties have to make a competing bid.  Yet in the UK – where bids take 
less time because they are more commonly for cash – bids are completed less frequently 
than in the US, where they take more time, because they are more frequently for stock.   
In fact, as reflected in Table 5 (Panel B), the difference in completion rates spans choice 
of consideration:  all-cash bids in the US remain more likely to be completed (89%) than 
all-cash bids in the UK (79%, p-value < .01).  As with bids generally, cash bids are much 
less likely to be completed in the presence of competition – roughly 60% of the time, 
versus 90% without competition – and as before the differences in completion rates in the 
presence of competition are not statistically different.  There is a statistically significant 
difference in completion rates of cash bids even without competition – 92% in the US vs. 
85% in the UK, possibly reflecting greater power of institutional shareholders in the UK 
to refuse to tender to low-ball bids that may be attempted in the absence of competition – 
but the magnitude of that difference is much smaller than the difference in competition 
rates. 
 
III.C  Bid Incidence 
 
The data reviewed so far are consistent with the hypotheses that UK regulation constrains 
break fees, increases bid competition and lowers bid completion rates, relative to US 
litigation.  If break fees are an importance inducement for bidding, the findings thus far 
suggest that we should also expect to see fewer bids in the UK.  Of course, the US is a 
larger economy, so the absolute number of bids would be expected to be higher in the 
US.  To normalize the bid data in the sample analyzed above, one would ideally want the 
number of listed firms that could generate $1 billion bids, but since bid premia 
themselves vary, and market capitalizations fluctuate frequently, generating the right 
stock of target firms for the above bid sample is not easy.  A more direct approach is 
possible:  gather a new sample from Thomson of all control bids for distinct listed 
companies and compare them to the total number of listed companies in each nation.  
22 Thomson includes competing bids – i.e., bids pending at the same time for the same 
target – as separate records in its M&A database.  Overlapping competing bids, which do 
not increase overall bid incidence, are removed (although doing this does not much affect 
the bottom line).  This exercise produces the data set out in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.  Bid Incidence, US vs. UK, 1990-2008 































































(d) / (h) 
 
1990 2,047  163  10  7%  6,134 395  22  6%  123% 
1991 2,058  152  17  7%  6,295 327  37  5%  142% 
1992 1,952  90  6  4%  6,080 286  23  4%  99% 
1993 1,930  91  4  5%  6,750 312  8  5%  100% 
1994 1,933  76  12  3%  7,121 422  32  5%  60% 
1995 1,977  92  5  4%  7,507 512  59  6%  73% 
1996 2,098  79  9  3%  7,993 537  43  6%  54% 
1997 2,036  107  14  5%  7,852 615  50  7%  63% 
1998 1,963  167  20  7%  7,520 725  36  9%  82% 
1999 1,819  242  37  11%  7,569 768  49  9%  119% 
2000 1,923  197  13  10%  6,830 666  58  9%  107% 
2001 1,912  119  2  6%  6,362 515  36  8%  81% 
2002 2,400  92  4  4%  5,664 359  26  6%  62% 
2003 2,315  126  23  4%  5,297 382  30  7%  67% 
2004 2,497  82  11  3%  5,243 310  27  5%  53% 
2005 2,751  115  15  4%  5,125 344  41  6%  61% 
2006 2,898  159  19  5%  5,104 441  46  8%  62% 
2007 2,579  109  20  3%  5,130 448  45  8%  44% 
2008 2,415  108  14  4%  5,611 324  21  5%  72% 
             
Total 41,502 2,366  255  5%  121,186 8,688  689  7%  77% 
 
Source:  Worldwide Federation of Exchanges (listings and domestic listings) and Thomson Financial (control bids).  Control bids are bids 
for 50.1+% of a listed target, excluding self-tenders.  For US, listings include Amex, NYSE, and Nasdaq; for UK, listings are on the LSE.  
Bids need not be completed.  Domestic listings are as reported for the years 1995-2008; for 1990-1994, the three-year average for 1995-
1998 is used.   
 
The data are consistent with those presented in Andrade et al. 2001, who use data from 
CRSP to construct estimates for total US M&A activity in the years 1962-1998.   
Although they present activity rates ranging from 2% to 5% in the years 1990-1998, the 
rates presented here are bid rates, rather than merger rates, as presented there – recall 
from Table 6 that 10 to 20% of bids are never completed.  This time series also includes 
all control bids, and not just bids that result in delistings, as presented in Andrade et al.  
In the sample of large bids analyzed above, in both the US and the UK, ~5% of 
completed control bids do not result in 100% of ownership, and an average of 15-20% of 
the target’s shares remain outstanding after the bid, so that some would continue to be 
listed after the bid, and not appear in the CRSP M&A delisting sample.   
 
Consistent with hypothesis 9, as reflected in the bottom right cell of the table, the overall 
control bid incidence rate in the UK from 1990 through 2008 was 77% of that in the US, 
and in 14 of the 18 years in the sample, the US rate exceeds that of the UK, usually by a 
significant margin.  These findings are consistent with Rossi & Volopin 2004 report that 
23 66% of US listed firms were acquired in their cross-country analysis of Thomson’s M&A 
database from an earlier but overlapping period, versus only 54% of UK listed firms – a 
ratio of 82%.  While many other factors may contribute to this difference, a lower bid 
incidence rate in the UK is consistent with the findings presented above – that break fee 
law inhibits some bids that might otherwise occur if the target were free to provide an 
initial bidder with insurance against the risk of competition. 
 
III.D  Break Fee Litigation 
 
What about litigation?  Does US reliance on court-enforced fiduciary duties to control the 
bidding process have an observable effect on the number of disputes generated by bids?  
The data in Table 7 suggest the answer to that question is yes:  bids in the UK simply do 
not generate reported litigation,
24 whereas five percent do in the US.  But that difference 
does not appear to be attributable to break fee disputes.  Litigation is actually less 
frequent in US bids with break fees than in those without break fees (4% vs. 10%, p-
value < .0001), and it is only in bids without reported break fees bid-related litigation 
reported in Thomson is statistically higher in the US than in the UK.  Presumably this is 
because break fees deter bid competition, which is correlated with deal litigation in the 
US (8.7% of bids facing competition generate litigation reported in Thomson, versus 
4.7% of bids without competition, p-value <.10).  
 
Table 7.   
 
Litigation Reported by Thomson in Large Bids in the US and UK, 1989-2008 
Panel A:  All bids  UK bids  US bids   p-value  
% with litigation   0.0       (n=209)  5.0      (n=1137)  0.00 
Break fee reported  0.0       (n=170)  3.7      (n=908)  0.22 
No break fee reported  0.0       (n=39)  10.0    (n=229)  0.00 
      
Panel B:  Cash bids  UK cash bids  US cash bids  p-value  
% with litigation   0.0       (n=136)  3.9        (n=627)  0.02 
Break fee reported  0.0       (n=36)  2.8        (n=504)  0.31 
No break fee reported  0.0       (n=100)  8.9        (n=123)  0.00 
 
These conclusions should be treated carefully, however, as Thomson’s data on litigation 
appears even more suspect than its data on break fee incidence.  Thomson, for example, 
reports zero litigation in $1+ billion bids from 2000 onwards.  This may surprise M&A 
litigators, who fought lawsuits over many of the $1+ billion bids in the Thomson 
database, including (for example) reported disputes (listed in Appendix A) over the 2008 
bid for William Wrigley Jr. Co.; the 2007 bids for Lear Corp. and Lyondell Chemical 
Co.; and the 2006 bid for Stone Energy Co. 
 
To further investigate the extent of US litigation specifically concerning break fees, the 
break fee cases listed in Appendix A were reviewed.   Few articulate any “law” that 
                                                 
24 Prior to the adoption of the bright-line rule in the Takeover Code, there was occasional litigation 
concerning break fees.  See Tarbert 2003; Takeover Panel (UK), Decision 1986/2 (Jan. 29, 1986) 
(approving break fee adopted in fight between Guiness PLC and Argyll Group PLC for Distillers PLC). 
24 would guide break fee practice.  Many concern procedural issues (e.g., whether a 
complaint, that includes allegations that target fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties 
by, among other things, agreeing to a break fee, states a claim; whether plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who sued in part based on break fees are entitled to fees for their efforts).  Of 
those that directly address the substantive question of when and what break fees are 
legitimate, several Delaware decisions explicitly refuse to provide clear general guidance 
on the proper size of a break fee, or specific facts that could justify or attack a larger-
than-typical break fee, or approve a fee on the primary ground that the same size fee had 
been approved in prior cases.
25  Still, there are decisions
26 that explicitly allow custom 
and practice to guide case outcomes by dismissing complaints where the break fee in 
question was within norms, and it is hard to believe that courts would not be more 
inclined to approve a break fee within customary size ranges than one that is not. 
 
                                                 
25 E.g., Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, Del.Ch. 
(Chandler, C.) (2007) (stating in dicta:  “Though a “3% rule” for termination fees might be convenient for 
transaction planners, it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to abuse, for this Court to bless as a 
blanket rule.”); In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 924 A.2d 171, 32 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 941, Del.Ch. (Strine, V.C.) (2007) (stating, in reviewing a deal that included a break fee the court 
characterized as “modest” in size, “The mere fact that a technique was used in different market 
circumstances by another board and approved by the court does not mean that it is reasonable in other 
circumstances that involve very different market dynamics.”).  Cf. Coates & Subramanian 2001 
(recommending courts give bids with fees over 3% a “particularly hard look”), quoted in In re Toys-R-Us 
Shareholder Litigation, 877 A.2d 975, Del. Ch. (Strine, V.C.) (2005) (rejecting any bright-line rules; citing 
fact that a 3.75% fee was not “unprecedented” as part of basis for upholding fee). 
 
26 E.g., Gut v. MacDonough, Not Reported in N.E.2d, 23 Mass.L.Rptr. 110, 2007 WL 2410131, 
Mass.Super., August 14, 2007 (NO. CIV.A. 2007-1083-C) (break fees “are customarily included in 
agreements of this nature... the independent financial consulting firm hired by Westborough, RBC, 
concluded that ... the amount of the termination fee [i.e., 5%, was] reasonable...”). 
 
25 What effects has the general reluctance of US courts to articulate break fee rules had? 
One could characterize the overall level of break fee litigation as large or small.  On the 
one hand, benchmarked against the UK, with zero litigation, it is significantly higher, and 
as reflected in Figure 2, it has been increasing in absolute terms since the early 1990s.  
On the other hand, benchmarked against the ~8000 bids for public targets in the US in the 
same time period, however, it is less than the 5% litigation rate reported by Thomson for 
the large bid sample, and much smaller than the 34% of hostile bids reported by Thomson 
to encounter litigation in the US (Armour & Skeel 2007), and the number of break fee 
cases divided by total bids has not increased significantly over the recent past.   
Figure 2 
 
More importantly, many of those litigated cases would likely have existed even if break 
fees were explicitly authorized up to some set percentage and forbidden beyond that 
percentage, as nearly all of the cases reviewed in Appendix A involved claims that the 
target’s boards breached their fiduciary duties in a number of respects, over and above 
the size of the break fee granted.  Typical, for example, are allegations that target boards 
had insufficient information, overly rushed the sales process, or favored one bidder over 
another without a reasonable justification.  Thus, the marginal effect on litigation 
incidence of the US courts’ reluctance to announce a rule regarding break fee size is 
likely to be nearly zero.  Only if the entirety of the M&A process were to be governed by 
a set of bright-line rules would the incidence of M&A litigation diminish to UK levels, 
and even the UK (as noted above) does not do without M&A litigation – it merely speeds 
it up and excludes lawyers from participating in it. 
 
26 In sum, the data are consistent with the general practitioner view that UK reliance on a 
regulatory approach to bid governance essentially eliminates bid-related litigation and its 
attendant costs, which is common in the US.  At the same time, the more permissive 
stance towards break fees that has developed in the US litigation-based governance 
system may actually moderate the amount of bid-related litigation that occurs in the US, 
because break fees deter competition and competition generates disputes. 
 
III.E.  Multivariate Results 
 
The basic univariate results presented above, showing lower break fees, higher 
competition rates, and lower completion rates in the UK, may be caused by other factors.  
Table 8 presents multivariate regressions that test this possibility to the extent feasible 
with available data.   
 
III.E.1.  Regressions 
 
In each case, a simple model is reported, with a single explanatory variable (UK, =1 if the 
target is a UK firm); a second model is reported, with available controls other than year 
or industry fixed effects; and then a third model is reported, with both year and industry 
(one-digit SIC code) fixed effects.  In parentheses are robust standard errors; coefficients 
or odds ratios that are statistically significant at the 95% level are in bold.  In unreported 
regressions, the limited data on toeholds in Thomson’s database was also included as a 
regressor, without affecting the reported results.  Litigation is included in the models for 
completion rate, but omitted from the models for break fee size and competition rates, 
because of the likelihood of reverse causation. 
 
Table 8.  
 
Multivariate Regressions 
 Break  Fee  Size 
(% of Bid Value) 
Competition Rate  Completion Rate 























































































Year  FE  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry  FE  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
           




0.009 0.132 0.219 0.026 0.058 0.094 0.005 0.071 0.132 
 OLS  Logistic  Logistic 
 
27 As can be seen, after controlling for other observed factors, compared to the US, UK 
break fees are estimated to be even lower, competition rates to be even higher, and 
completion rates to be even lower than univariate tests would suggest.  For break fees, the 
only significant control (other than time and industry dummies) is bid size:  break fees 
increase at a decreasing rate in bid size.  Other factors held constant, UK break fees are 
nearly two percentage points lower than US fees.  For competition, cash bids encounter 
twice as much competition as other bids, other factors held constant; and for each ten 
billion dollars a bid is larger, the competition rate increases by a multiple of 10.3.   
Industry and time controls only sharpen the effects on bid competition, which is nearly 
three times as likely in the UK than in the US.  UK bids, which appear to be completed 
about 60% as often as US bids in a univariate regression, become even less likely to be 
completed after taking into account the combined effects of the higher incidence of cash 
consideration (which reduces the odds of bid completion), the higher incidence of tender 
offers (which dramatically increases the odds of bid completion), cross-border bids 
(which are more likely to close), and same-industry bids (which are also more likely to 
close).  Litigation, present only in the US, appears to reduce the odds of deal completion, 
but this effect does not persist after inclusion of time and industry controls. 
 
If we replace the UK dummy with break fee size in the models of bid competition or bid 
completion, or we get similar results.  In unreported results, break fee size is statistically 
significant correlated (p<.01) with bid competition (inversely) and bid completion 
(positively), with and without the same controls show in Table 8.  The point estimates are 
reasonable and economically significant.  In models with year and industry fixed effects, 
for every point higher a break fee is as a percentage of bid value, the odds of a 
competitive bid are reduced by 28% -- e.g., from a sample average of 10% to 7.2%.  
Likewise, the odds of bid completion are increased by 128% -- e.g., moving from a 
typical UK break fee of 1% to a typical US break fee of 3% would increase the 
completion rate from 90% to about 93%.  
 
III.E.2  Placebo Tests on Block Purchases 
 
The results presented above are consistent with the hypothesis that the UK approach to 
break fees has important effects not only break fee size but also on bid competition and 
bid completion rates.  A skeptic might wonder about unobserved, omitted factors that 
might correlate with differences between the UK and US M&A markets, on the one hand, 
and break fee size and bid outcomes, on the other hand.  One way to test for this 
possibility is to run the same regressions using a different data set that consists of UK and 
US bids that are much less susceptible (or not susceptible at all) to bid competition, viz., 
block purchases.   
 
For this purpose, we examine bids that were drawn the initial sample described above but 
were dropped because the bidders sought less than 50% of the target’s stock in the bid.  
Such block purchases are either invulnerable to bid competition because the bidder 
already owns a control block of the target, because (as with a negotiated buyback from a 
existing blockholder) the bid would not be subject to shareholder approval, or because the 
block being sought would not plausibly provide control to a competing bidder, who could 
28 seek, would typically be better off seeking, to purchase a similarly sized block on the 
open market after the initial bid is completed.  In effect, the sub-control block bids 
dropped from the initial sample can be used as a “placebo test” of hypotheses 5 
through 8.   
 
The placebo sample consists of 626 bids.  Of those, 65% (n=406) are buybacks – bids by 
a company for its own stock.  The rest (n=220) are third-party bids, but the median bid is 
for 22% of the target, and over a third of the bids are for less than 10%; of those where 
the bid seeks more than 22%, the bidder already owns more than 50% of the target in 
more than 75% of the bids, and more than 40% in more than 90% of the bids.  Consistent 
with the basic idea that break fees are designed to deter competition, or provide insurance 
against the possibility competition emerges, only six of the non-buyback placebo bids 
included a break fee, and only one of the buyback placebo bids included a break fee (the 
unusual buyback of John Malone’s 16% toehold in News Corp., which helped preserve 
30%-blockowner’s Rupert Murchoch’s control and was subject to News Corp. 
shareholder approval.  All were for US targets.   
 
In the placebo sample, unlike the main sample, UK bids encountered no competition, 
whereas US non-buyback bids did (although the difference is not statistically significant), 
and UK bids were more (not less) likely to be completed than US bids, and were 
completed more often in the UK than were the control bids analyzed above (95% vs. 
85%, p-value < 0.03).  The fact of higher completion rates in the UK than in the US – 
which, recall, is the opposite of what holds in the main sample, where competition is a 
threat – is not statistically significant when the sample is broken down into buybacks and 
non-buybacks (for either subsample), but regains statistical significance for buybacks 
only after inclusion of the controls used in the main regressions above.  In sum, the 
placebo sample shows that in block purchases, where competition is not a serious threat, 
break fees are uncommon in either nation, UK bids encounter no more competition, and 
UK bids are, if anything, more likely to be completed than US bids (for buybacks).  If 
something other than break fees is driving the higher levels of competition and lower 
levels of completion in control bids in the UK, the omitted factor does not have the same 
affect on non-control block purchases. 
 
IV.  Summary of Findings, Limits and Lessons 
 
IV.A  Summary of Findings.  The data reviewed above provide evidence consistent with 
a number of the hypotheses stated in Part II.  Break fee law appears to bind in both the 
UK and the US:  (1) UK break fees do not exceed 1%; (2) US break fees vary more than 
UK break fees; and (3) the US experiences break fee litigation, whereas (4) the UK does 
not.  Break fee demand appears to vary, and the modal demand appears to exceed 1% of 
bid value, so that (5) UK break fees cluster just below or at 1%, but (6) US break fees 
typically exceed 1% by 2-3 times.  On the other hand, the data appear inconsistent with 
common conjectures about the functioning of “common law” courts:  (7) US fee 
litigation appears to be increasing, not diminishing, over time; and (8) US fee variation 
has not fallen.  Finally, the effects of break fee law appears to matter more than to just 
break fee design:  (9) bid competition is higher in the UK than in the US, (10) bid 
29 completion rates are lower in the UK than in the US, and (11) bid incidence for listed 
target firms is generally lower in the UK than in the US.   
 
IV.B  Limits.  A number of factors may limit the extendability of this paper.  First, M&A 
contests typically promise large benefits to well-funded participants.  The parties affected 
can, in a general sense, afford to lobby and litigate, and are, in general terms, evenly 
matched.  This is not a context in which disputes arise between large, organized, well-
funded producers and dispersed resource constrained individuals.  One exception – 
discussed briefly above – was the absence of organized institutional shareholders in the 
US when hostile bids first emerged in the 1950s, but even that absence has dissipated 
over time.  Second, M&A contests have few large externalities identifiable ex ante (other 
than on bidders and shareholders).  While the choice of bidder may in fact have important 
third-party effects (through layoffs, increases in creditor risk, changes in taxes), these 
effects and their precise incidence are rarely known in advance.  Third, M&A break fees 
are not generally salient – in either political or moral terms – to the public.  No politician 
directly elected by the general population is ever likely to get elected because of his/er 
position on break fees.   
 
IV.B.  Lessons.  With those limits in mind, what are potential lessons from the contrast 
between the UK and US approaches to M&A break fees?   
 
IV.B.1  Observed Advantages of Regulation 
 
The UK’s regulatory approach exhibits clear benefits.  It generates little or no litigation, 
provides clear guidance for market participants, keeps fees low, and increases bid 
competition.  More generally, it may make it harder for target fiduciaries to favor bidders 
for private benefits, but such a conjecture presumes target fiduciaries are not otherwise 
constrained or incentivized properly, and that ex post litigation would do a worse of job 
of constraining target agency costs than regulation.   
 
IV.B.2  Observed Advantages of Litigation 
 
On the other hand, by capping fees at what is a low amount, relative to that chosen in the 
less regulated US M&A environment, UK regulation likely results in the underprovision 
of insurance for bidders for transaction and opportunity costs if they bid and another 
bidder ultimately prevails, and for the non-contractible certification benefit a bid gives a 
target.  Given that 95% of US break fees exceed the one percent cap applicable in the 
UK, it seems unlikely that all of these fees represent target agency costs.  The US’s 
litigation approach likely permits more value-adding fees to be used.  The result is likely 
to be more bidding in the US than in the UK.  If targets are otherwise forced or pressured 
to sell themselves, the social loss may not be significant.  But if targets can and do refuse 
to put themselves “in play” with a bid they consider too low, and if bidders hold back 
because they cannot insure against competition risk, there may be welfare losses from too 
little M&A in the UK.  
 
30 To be sure, factors (legal or non-legal) other than break fees may explain this difference:  
the US economy may be more dynamic to achieve economies of scale or scope or other 
benefits of deal activity, and other rules or practices (e.g., inhibitions against high levels 
of executive compensation and severance in the UK) may drive the difference.  Even if it 
could be established that the UK has less M&A than the US as a result of break fee 
governance, some would argue that is a good thing, as many deals may be driven by 
misvaluations or other market imperfections (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny 2003).  Net benefits 
of UK regulation of fees are difficult to gauge, at best.
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IV.B.3  Missing Advantage of Regulation 
 
While the UK approach seems to provide some of the conventionally identified benefits 
of regulation, it does not seem to reflect one:  expertise.  While the UK Takeover Panel 
does have greater expertise than generalist courts, it does not seem to have used that 
expertise in devising its rule on break fees.  Nothing in the brief statement accompanying 
the adoption of the one percent rule suggests that any careful study or analysis went into 
the rule, and the Panel has left it unchanged for the past 10 years.  Indeed, given the 
character of the rule, it is hard to see how the Takeover Panel could develop expertise; 
with variation essentially eliminated, they have lost the ability to look for differential 
effects of different fees.  
 
IV.B.4  Missing Advantage of Litigation 
 
Likewise, the US approach, while preserving greater flexibility and variation in break fee 
use, does not seem to reflect one of the conventionally identified benefits of litigation:  
evolution towards clearer and better standards over time.  US courts, particularly in 
Delaware, seem to go out of their way to refuse to provide guidance on what is or is not 
an acceptable fee, retaining discretion to find the same fee acceptable in one case and 
unacceptable in another, based on factors that they never identify clearly.  As noted 
above, the general standard used in Delaware – fees that induce bids are acceptable, fees 
that preclude bids are not – is useless in practice, since nearly all fees may do both.  This 
standard is the same standard used 20 years ago, after dozens of cases have presented 
Delaware’s chancery with the opportunity to refine or clarify the standard.  As a result, 
litigation over break fees in the US continues at a high pace, showing no signs of 
diminishing over time. 
 
Nor can Delaware’s reluctance to clarify its fee standard be attributed to the general 
desire of courts to retain some discretion to prevent private parties from evading or 
working around a clear rule.  It would be possible, for example, for the court to establish 
a presumption that a 2-3% fee would be presumed to be legitimate absent clear evidence 
suggesting that it was produced by a violation of the target board’s duties in some other 
respect, or a presumption that a fee over 4% would be presumed to be excessive absent 
clear evidence that the bidder had incurred greater than normal bidding costs.  Such 
                                                 
27 An interesting question, not taken up here, would be to compare the performance of firms acquired and 
not acquired in the US and the UK, to see if the difference in bid rates may contribute to differences in 
observable corporate performance over time. 
31 presumptions could provide parties with guidance, increasing bidding certainty and 
lowering legal costs, without committing the court to strike down (or uphold) fees 
contrary to the presumptions.  Delaware courts have not been willing to go even this far. 
 
IV.B.5  Stasis in Both Regimes 
 
Neither the UK nor the US seem to exhibit meaningful legal change over time, as applied 
to break fees.  Legal inertia can be a benefit:  it allows for greater awareness of the legal 
rule to spread and shape behavior, and it encourages private parties to make investments 
that depend on the law not changing.  On the other hand, if laws are imperfect but can be 
improved over time, with experience, the fact of inertia in both regimes may be troubling.  
It is consistent with a public choice explanation of law in both nations.   
 
IV.B.6 Interaction of Lawmaker Incentives and Private Interests  
 
In the UK, the Takeover Code is still dominated by institutional shareholders, who reap 
the immediate benefits of greater competition conditional on a bid, and whose power to 
choose among bids would be diminished by a looser regime governing break fees.  A 
looser regime might benefit shareholders by encouraging more bidding, but the incidence 
of increased M&A would be hard to predict, and would be shared with bidders and other 
market participants, who face collective action problems already overcome in the UK by 
institutions represented on the Takeover Panel. By reflecting institutional shareholder 
dominance in the membership rules governing the Takeover Panel, the UK has 
institutionalized a political victory dating back to the 1950s, which seems highly unlikely 
to be open to legal changes that would hurt its dominant constituency, even if doing so 
would benefit the economy or society.   In addition, the structure and incentives of the 
Takeover Panel may explain the initial choice of a bright-line rule.  Although the Panel 
has a full-time staff, Panel members themselves (who decide Panel policy and resolve 
disputes) have other full-time jobs, and are not compensated for their work on the Panel, 
which at least blunts – and probably reverses – any incentive they might have to maintain 
vague standards to preserve disputes.  When break fees began to be used more widely in 
the 1990s in the UK, the rule adopted by the Panel minimizes the need for Panel guidance 
or dispute resolution on break fees, reducing the time demanded of Panel members. 
 
In the US, break fee law remains an opaque preserve of professional lawyers and courts.  
The loose standards used to evaluate fees generate widely varying business norms and 
expensive litigation, and prevents others from easily knowing what is and what is not 
legal, in a key aspect of M&A practice.  This state of affairs generates rents for litigators 
and transactional lawyers, who can honestly claim an ever-so-slightly greater ability to 
read the legal tea-leaves in a particular context, and leverage that advisory role into 
boardroom networks and repeat business.  It also makes life more interesting for judges, 
who serve full-time multi-year terms, until they retire and join the ranks of well-
compensated lawyers.  Delaware’s Chancellor Chandler, who wrote one of the recent 
Delaware decisions firmly rejecting bright-line rule-like approaches to fee review,
28 was 
                                                 
28 Louisiana, supra note 12; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 45 (2002) (declining to adopt bright-
line test for whether a consulting fee was material for purposes of determining a director’s independence in 
32 a lawyer at one of the leading Delaware corporate litigation law firms before becoming a 
judge.
29  One need not imagine – and I do not suggest – that the Chancellor had any 
intent to benefit his future self, or his fellow jurists, in writing that decision.  All that is 
required was a judiciary socialized in a culture of standards-based justice (Kamar 1998; 
Rock 1997).  The other Vice Chancellors have exhibited similar concerns for “justice” as 
expressed in a resistance to rules in favor of standards.
30 In the US, the cadre of deal 
lawyers are at the forefront of defending Delaware, and its judiciary, against the slightest 
risk of intrusion by Congress or the SEC and its tendency towards bright-line rules.
31
 
At the same time, a simple dichotomy of UK regulation protected by institutions and US 
litigation protected by lawyers is overly simple.  The UK approach to break fees is in the 
context of a legal system that still relies to a significant extent on litigation.  Even the 
subject of M&A is governed by a system that is at most a hybrid – a specialized 
regulatory body applying general standards – but using a bright-line rule for break fees.  
And the US approach is in the context of a legal system that is replete with bright-line 
rules, including rules adopted by the SEC,
32 statutes adopted by the Delaware 
legislature,
33 and rules articulated by the Delaware courts.
34  In the US, too, institutional 
shareholders have become increasingly active in politics over the past twenty years, but 
have exhibited no general preference for regulation over litigation, and no interest in 
lobbying to law relevant to break fees.  At a minimum, this suggests that a plausible 
                                                                                                                                                 
reviewing a conflict transaction) (Chandler, C.).  There is a certain irony in the Chancellor’s refusal to 
provide better guidance to practitioners, given his criticism of the failure of practitioners to provide 
sufficient guidance to courts in drafting M&A contracts.  Cf. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 
et al. Civil Action No. 3360-CC (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2007) (Chandler, C.), slip op. at 2 (characterizing use of 
hierarchical phrases such as “subject to” in lieu of harmonizing disparate contract language as “inartful 
drafting”) with United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc. and RAM Acquisition Corp., [--] A.3d [--] [--] 
(Del. 2007) (Chandler, C.) (characterizing agreement as the product of “a deeply flawed negotiation in 
which both sides failed to clearly and consistently communicate their client’s positions” but holding that an 
“interpretation of the Agreement that relies on the parties’ addition of hierarchical phrases, instead of the 
deletion of particular language altogether, is not unreasonable as a matter of law” and acknowledging that 
“the law of contracts ... does not require parties to choose optimally clear language; in fact, parties often 
riddle their agreements with a certain amount of ambiguity in order to reach a compromise”).   
 
29 See courts.delaware.gov/courts/court%20of%20chancery/?jud_off.htm (describing careers of current 
Delaware court); see also www.paulweiss.com/resources/news/detail.aspx?news=1947 (announcing move 
of recently retired vice-chancellor to start major New York law firm’s Delaware office). 
30 E.g., Netsmart, supra note 25 (Strine, V.C.). 
31  Comments from major law firms on the recently proposed SEC rule providing shareholders access to 
company proxy statements illustrates the point.  See www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml, and 
particularly the comment from seven law firms, available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
212.pdf at 3 (suggesting the SEC not adopt its proposed rule 14a-11 “in the interests of federalism” in order 
to allow state law initiatives in Delaware and elsewhere “to flourish”). 
32 E.g., companies with more than $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders must register with the SEC.  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1); SEC Rule 12g-1. 
33 A majority of directors and a majority of shareholders may approve a merger of a company with another 
and, if desired, cash out other shareholders, by following formal steps specified in D.G.C.L. § 251. 
34 For example, Delaware shareholders may not seek to enjoin a merger simply on the ground that it will 
convert their stock into cash or stock of another company (Weiss 1983). 
33 theory of the incidence of regulation and litigation will require finer explanatory variables 
than those that apply to nations as a whole, such as their legal origin, and will need to 
include some allowance for historical contingencies.  A theory that points to differential 
collective action costs will need to attend to the fact that the same set of trade 
organizations and institutions can produce a system that includes bright-line rules and 
vague standards simultaneously.  The vices and virtues of each method are likely to have 
different values at different levels of legal specificity.  Exploring law with that much 
precision will no doubt complicate the theory, and perhaps make it difficult to articulate 
any plausible regularities spanning laws within a nation, much less across multiple 
nations, and make it harder for an institution like the World Bank to use the analysis to 
create simple rule-like schemes to reward or punish growth-oriented legal reform.   




This paper has contrasted UK and US governance of M&A break fees with a view to 
what the contrast can teach us about the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, 
including how laws change under each regime over time.  The UK caps fees at a low 
level with a simple ex ante rule based not on regulatory expertise but on an arbitrarily 
chosen percentage of bid value, which nonetheless has the virtues of clarity and lower 
litigation costs, and enhances competition conditional on an initial bid.  US courts 
evaluate fees ex post with a complex standard, allowing for greater variation and higher 
average fees, reducing the risk of bidding and possibly increasing M&A overall, at the 
cost of significant amounts of ongoing litigation, in part because courts resist articulating 
clear rules.  Laws in each nation exhibit inertia; are protected by entrenched interest 
groups (institutions in the UK, lawyers in the US); and co-exist with the opposite 
approach (litigation in the UK, regulation in the US), even within the domain of M&A 
law.  Subject to strong limits on external validity, the case study suggests that interest 
groups may be the most important factors shaping the initial choice between regulation 
and litigation, even for otherwise similar nations in a similar context, and that a 
combination of interest groups formed in response to a given choice, as well as lawmaker 
incentives, may preserve those choices even after the conditions giving rise to the initial 
choice have passed away. 
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